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1. Introduction 
A large social-science literature is emerging on the determinants of happiness and 
mental well-being.  As would be expected, this topic has attracted the attention of 
medical statisticians, psychologists, economists, and other investigators (including 
Easterlin 2003, Frey and Stutzer 2002, Lucas et al 2004, Layard 2005, Smith et al 
2005, Ubel et al 2005, Gilbert 2006, and Kahneman et al 2006).  However, a 
fundamental research question remains poorly understood.  What is the relationship 
between age and well-being? 
Traditional surveys of the field, such as Myers (1992), Diener et al (1999) and 
Argyle (2001), argue that happiness is either flat or very slightly increasing in age.  
Mroczek and Kolarz (1998) provide a discussion of psychologists’ earlier writings. 
However, much new work has argued that there is evidence of a U-shape through the 
life cycle.  In cross-sections, even after correcting for potentially confounding 
influences, there is now thought to be a convex link between reported well-being and 
age.  This modern literature includes Clark and Oswald (1994), Gerlach and Stephan 
(1996), Oswald (1997), Theodossiou (1998), Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), 
Blanchflower (2001), Di Tella et al (2001, 2003), Frey and Stutzer (2002), 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Graham (2005), Frijters et al (2004, 2005), Senik 
(2004), Van Praag and Ferrer-I-Carbonell (2004), Shields and Wheatley Price (2005), 
Oswald and Powdthavee (2005), Propper et al (2005), Powdthavee (2005), Bell and 
Blanchflower (2006), Uppal (2006), and Blanchflower and Oswald (2007).  Clark et 
al (1996) makes a similar argument for job satisfaction equations.  Pinquart and 
Sorensen (2001) develops an equivalent case for a measure of loneliness, and Hayo  3
and Seifert (2003) does so for a measure of economic subjective well-being.  Jorm 
(2000) reviews the psychiatric evidence and concludes that there are conflicting 
results on how the probability of depression alters over the life course. 
There is an important difficulty with the conclusion that well-being is U-
shaped in age.  As Easterlin (2006) points out, the effect of an age variable is likely to 
be contaminated by omitted cohort effects (earlier generations may have been born in, 
say, particularly good or bad times).  Hence the U-shape in age, uncovered now by 
various authors, could be an artifact of the data.   
This is more than a theoretical possibility.  Suicide levels seem to vary across 
cohorts (Stockard and O’Brien 2002).  Moreover, Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) 
find some evidence of rising well-being among young people.  There is also evidence 
-- for example, in Sacker and Wiggins 2002 -- that levels of depression and 
psychiatric distress, measured consistently across cohorts, have risen in countries 
such as Great Britain.  Nevertheless, these matters are still the subject of debate 
(Murphy et al 2000, Paykel 2000).   
New work by Clark and Oswald (2007) argues that in British panel data on 
well-being it can be shown that the U-shape in age is identified entirely from the 
longitudinal element of the data set.  The authors’ study can be thought of as literally 
following the aging process of particular individuals at different points in the lifespan.  
Nevertheless, such research is rare and does not allow cohort effects to be examined, 
and it seems important to inquire into the foundations of the U-shape in other nations. 
2. Testing for Cohort Effects    
This paper offers some of the first cross-country evidence that the curvilinear 
relationship is robust to cohort effects.  We draw upon randomly sampled data on 
approximately 500,000 Americans and Europeans.  These data come from the  4
General Social Surveys of the United States and the Eurobarometer Surveys, and, 
necessarily for the design of the test, cover some decades.   
One point, however, should perhaps be made clear from the outset.  It is that 
the paper can examine only simple so-called single-item measures of well-being, so 
cannot allow subtle differentiation -- as favoured in psychology journals -- into what 
might be thought of as different types of, or sides to, human happiness or mental 
health.  Nevertheless, the patterns that emerge are perhaps of interest. 
After controlling for different birth-cohorts, the paper finds that ceteris-
paribus well-being reaches its minimum in a person’s 40s.  This U-shape is similar for 
males and females, and on each side of the Atlantic Ocean.  Moreover, because of the 
size of our data sets, the turning point in well-being -- the age at which happiness 
begins to lift back up -- is fairly precisely determined. 
The paper’s concern is with the ceteris paribus correlation between well-being 
and age, so we later partial out other factors, such as income and marital status, that 
both alter over a typical person’s lifetime and have effects upon well-being.  This 
follows one particular tradition of empirical research.  We read the effect of a 
variable’s coefficient from a long regression equation in which other influences have 
been controlled for as effectively as possible.   
Despite the commonness of this convention in modern social-science research, 
such a method is not inevitable.  A valid and different approach is that of, for 
example, Easterlin (2006), who focuses on the raw or reduced-form link between 
happiness and age.   Interestingly, he finds evidence of an inverted U-shape.  As 
Easterlin points out, and as explained also in Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), if few 
or no control variables other than age are included in an American happiness 
regression estimated from the General Social Survey, the effect of age is concave and  5
not convex.  A related result is that of Mroczek and Spiro (2005), who establish in a 
data set on American veterans, where the youngest person in the data set is 40 years 
old (making it hard to do an exact comparison with research on the GSS), that 
happiness rises to the early 60s, and then appears to decline. 
As common observation shows, the quality of a person’s health and physical 
abilities depends sensitively on the point in the life cycle.  Most diseases, and the 
probability of getting them, worsen with age.  A 90 year old man cannot in general do 
the same number of push-ups as a 20 year old man.  Hence an important issue is 
whether in happiness equations it is desirable to control in some way for health and 
physical vitality.  There is here no unambiguously correct answer, but the approach 
taken in the paper is not to include independent variables that measure physical 
health.  This is partly pragmatic: our data sets have no objective measures and few 
subjective ones.  But the decision is partly substantive: it seems interesting to ask 
whether older people are happier once only simple demographic and economic 
variables are held constant. 
3. Conceptual Issues 
There is relatively little social-science theory upon which to draw (though 
mention should perhaps be made of Carstensen’s theory, which, put informally, is that 
age is associated with increasing motivation to derive emotional meaning from life 
and decreasing motivation to expand one's horizons: Carstensen et al 1999 and 
Charles et al 2001). 
Conventional economics is in principle capable of making predictions about 
the life cycle structure of happiness if conceptualized as utility in the normal 
economist’s framework.  However, in practice, economists’ standard life-cycle theory  6
does not generate a U-shape in a straightforward way.  Instead, the natural conclusion 
is that well-being might be predicted to be independent of age.   
To see why, let the individual person be concerned to maximize lifetime 
utility V by choosing a consumption path c(a) where a is the individual’s age. Assume 
lifespan runs deterministically from time point t to time point T.  Assume away 
discounting for simplicity (it is straightforward to show here that it makes no 
substantive difference, given an efficient capital market where people both discount 
utility at rate r and can lend or borrow at interest rate r).  Let income y be fixed and 
given by the agent’s talent endowment, and for simplicity set this to unity.  Then the 
agent chooses consumption c at each age a to maximize lifetime happiness 
  ∫ =
T
t
da a c u V ) , (   (1) 
subject to an inter-temporal borrowing constraint 
∫ =
T
t
da a c ) ( 1     (2) 
in which the endowment of income to be allocated across all the periods has been 
normalized to one.  Assume that u, utility or well-being, is an increasing and concave 
function of consumption, c.  Spending, by assumption, then makes people happier.   
This is a so-called isoperimetric problem.  The first-order condition for a 
maximum is the usual one: it requires the marginal utility of consumption to be the 
same at each level of age, a. Therefore, solving a Lagrangean L constructed from (1) 
and (2): 
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where, from the underlying mathematical structure, the multiplier lambda is 
necessarily constant across all the different ages from t to T.  Individuals thus allocate 
their discretionary spending to the points in time when they enjoy it most. 
  If the utility function u(c,a) is additively separable in consumption c and age a, 
then equation (3) has a simple implication.  It is one that is implicit in much of 
economic theory.  Consumption will be flat through time (because under separability 
u = u(c)) + v(a)) and, therefore, utility will also be flat through the lifespan if the non-
consumption part of utility, v(.), is independent of age.  In plainer language, 
happiness will not alter over a person’s life course. 
  It is reasonable to suggest that to go from the utility function u = u(c,a) to the 
presumption that u(..) is additively separable in its two arguments is a large, and 
potentially unwarranted, step.  There is no clear reason why the marginal utility of 
consumption would be independent of a person’s age.  For example, one might 
believe that young people wish to signal their status more, and therefore might have a 
greater return from units of consumption than the old (so the cross-partial derivative 
of u(c,a) would then be negative).  Alternatively, one might argue that older people 
have more need of health and medical spending, and therefore that the marginal 
utility of c is greatest at high levels of a.  Then the cross-partial of u(c,a) is positive.   
While it would be possible to assume that early in life the first effect 
dominates and then in later life the second one dominates, and in this way get 
eventually to a model where well-being was U-shaped through the lifespan, to do so 
seems too ad hoc (or post-hoc) to be persuasive theoretically.  What this means is that 
textbook economics -- without making assumptions about v(a) that could 
mechanically lead to any desired shape -- is not capable of producing clear 
predictions about the nonlinear pattern of well-being through an individual’s life.   8
4. Empirical Results 
To explore this issue empirically, therefore, we draw upon two data sets, which pool 
data on approximately half a million randomly selected individuals, and implement a 
test that controls for the possible existence of cohort effects.  The data do not follow 
the same individuals through time.  They provide repeated statistically-representative 
snapshots, year after year, covering all ages of American and European adults from 
age 16 and above.   
The key evidence is summarized in four tables.   
Table 1 takes all the males in the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS) from 
1974-2004.  It estimates a happiness regression equation for this sub-sample, and 
shows in its early columns that well-being is U-shaped in age.  Then cohort variables 
are introduced.  These take the form of a set of dummy variables – one dummy for 
each decade of birth.  Although the introduction of the cohort dummies affects the 
turning point of the quadratic function in age, it does not do so in a way that changes 
the thrust of the idea that well-being follows a U-shaped path.  The same statistical 
procedure is followed for the analysis of three further sub-samples, namely, the 
females in the GSS data set, the males in the Eurobarometer survey, and finally the 
females in the same European sample.    
The exact wording of the GSS well-being question is: “Taken all together, 
how would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very happy, 
pretty happy, or not too happy?”   
In the Eurobarometer survey it is: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”      
To give a feel for the raw patterns in the data, happiness in the United States 
can be expressed in a cardinal way by assigning 1 to 3 to the three answers above,  9
where ‘very happy’ is a 3.  In that case, the mean of US happiness in the data is 2.2 
with a standard deviation of 0.6.  Similarly, European life satisfaction can be 
cardinalized using the integers 1 to 4, where ‘very satisfied’ is a 4.  In this case, the 
mean of life satisfaction is 3.0 with a standard deviation of 0.8.  Well-being answers 
are skewed, in both data sets, somewhat towards the upper end of the possible 
distribution.   
The paper tests for a U-shape by examining whether the data take a quadratic 
form in age.  Almost all the coefficients on age-squared variables in the main part of 
the paper are statistically significant at the 0.0001 level.  We estimate the effects by 
using ordered logit equations.  The tables report estimated coefficients, which is an 
alternative to odds ratios.  This option affects only how results are displayed and not 
how they are estimated.   
  In the first column of Table 1 a GSS happiness ordered logit equation is 
estimated on the pooled sample of 19,027 American males with age entered as an 
independent variable.  It has, as further independent regressors, a separate dummy 
variable for each year in the data set and for each region of the United States.  This is 
to mop up year-by-year variation in national well-being and unchanging spatial 
characteristics such as regions’ climatic conditions. 
The age regressor in the first column of Table 1 has a positive coefficient of 
0.0096 and a t-statistic of approximately 11.  Hence reported happiness rises as 
people get older.  In column 2 of Table 1, a set of further regressors are included into 
the equation, and the coefficient on age falls somewhat, to 0.0066, with a t-statistic 
that indicates it continues to be statistically significantly different from zero at usual 
confidence levels.  These extra regressors are a variable for the years of education of 
the person, two dummies for racial type, 8 dummies for the number of dependent  10
children of the individual,  a collection of different dummy variables to capture the 
working status (employed, unemployed, …) of the person, a dummy variable that 
takes the value one if the individual reported that his or her parents had divorced by 
the time the individual respondent was aged 16, and 4 dummy variables to capture the 
person’s marital status.  Table 1 goes on to check for a turning point in age.  It does so 
in the simplest way, by fitting a level and a squared term.  Table 1 finds in column 3 
that a quadratic form seems to approximate the data well: the equation traces out a 
happiness function that reaches a minimum at 36.8 years of age. This is effectively 
the U-shaped result in the literature to date. 
However, Table 1 then explores the possibility that the U-shape in age is a 
product merely of omitted cohort effects.  Column 4 of Table 1 extends the 
specification by introducing a separate dummy variable for each decade of birth (it 
cannot enter a full set of individual birth-year dummies because the result would be 
complete collinearity).  The outcome is a U-shape in age, but one where the turning 
point is now much later in the typical individual’s life.  According to the evidence in 
column 4 of Table 1, subjective well-being among randomly selected American 
males, bottoms out at an estimated 55.9 years.  This is to be thought of, of course, as 
the minimum-happiness age after controlling for other influences such as education 
and marital status.  
Finally, column 5 of Table 1 introduces an income measure into the equation 
explaining well-being (although the causal interpretation here is open to debate, 
Gardner and Oswald 2007 document longitudinal evidence that windfalls raise mental 
well-being).  For simplicity, and following much of the literature, income is entered 
as the natural logarithm of the person’s family income.  The coefficient is positive 
(with a t-statistic of 6.83), so richer people report higher levels of happiness with their  11
lives.  Here the U-shape in age bottoms out at age 49.5.  The sample size is somewhat 
reduced, because of missing income observations, to 11,404 people.  
The remainder of the paper’s evidence is similar.  Table 2 moves to a sub-
sample of females from the US General Social Survey.  Compared to Table 1, the 
sample size is a little larger (because women live longer than men) at 24,148 
individuals.  Once again, each reports a well-being answer on a three-point scale from 
very happy down to not at all happy, and Table 2 estimates an ordered logit equation 
with the same structure as for the males in Table 1.   
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the analytical structure for American women 
is almost the same as for the men.   
In Table 2, well-being is at first increasing in age.  But once a squared term in 
age is introduced, in the third column, it is clear that the data favour a quadratic form, 
so once again happiness seems strongly U-shaped in age.  When the same set of 
cohort dummies are incorporated into the equation, in column 4 of Table 2, the 
turning point of the happiness function is at age 44.9 years.   This is noticeably less 
than the 55.9 years estimated for the male sub-sample.  However, allowing for the 
separate effect of income upon well-being in column 5 makes women look more like 
the men.  The minimum in column 5 of Table 2 is reached at age 45.1.  Whatever is 
going on, in some sense that may not be immediately understandable, these data are 
apparently working in roughly but not exactly the same way for American males and 
females.    
  With only minor differences, Tables 3 and 4 tell the same story, but use 
Eurobarometer data pooled from 1975 to 1998.  Here, of course, the continent is 
different and the sample sizes far larger.  A slightly different form of well-being 
question (on life satisfaction) has to be employed, but as these estimation methods  12
effectively use only the ordering of well-being answers, the exact wording is unlikely 
to matter significantly, and so empirically it seems to prove.   
In Table 3, an ordered logit is estimated for 200,848 males from France, 
Belgium, Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, Great Britain, 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal.  To allow comparisons, the aim is to achieve an 
econometric specification as close as possible, despite some differences in the data 
sets on topics such as the level of detail in the measure of income, to that for the 
United States in Tables 1 and 2.   
Before the cohort dummies are introduced, the turning point in the male well-
being equation is at a minimum point where age is equal to 43.4 years (see column 3 
of Table 3).  It is not easy to say why this number might be higher than in the USA 
(see column 3 of Table 1), but one possibility is that the Second World War may have 
exacted a toll in various ways on this generation of European males.  Whatever the 
reason, the difference with the United States continues by the time column 4 is 
estimated.  Now the age at which well-being reaches a minimum is 47.1 years, which 
is below the American number.   
After the role of income is entered into the specification, the minimum is 44.1 
years. Table 4 produces similar figures, and equations, for the female sub-sample of 
214,857 randomly sampled European women. 
At the suggestion of a referee, the Appendix sets out a number of robustness 
checks and inquiries.  In the interests of brevity, only the results for males are given.   
Table A1 reveals that it is the addition of dummies for marital status that first 
makes the U-shape evident in the data of the United States, and this quadratic is 
strengthened by a control for years of schooling (see, for example, columns 3 and 4).  
It is allowing for an income variable that makes the minimum point of the U-shape in  13
happiness move considerably further to the right (in the last column of Table A1).  
These changes across specifications are less noticeable in European data (as in Table 
A3).  Table A2 divides the data into sub-samples.  It is evident that there is a strong 
U-shape in age among the sub-sample of American males who never married.  This 
suggests that, in the full sample, the quadratic is not merely somehow proxying the 
fact that happy people tend to go on to get married more.  The same general result is 
found for Europe in the final two columns of Table A3, where the minimum point of 
well-being is estimated at age 49.1 for single Europeans and 37.6 for ever-married 
Europeans.  Although they are omitted, equivalent results were found for females in 
each continent.   
A full set of interaction terms -- interacting the quadratic in age with the other 
independent variables -- was also tried, as a robustness check, but these were found to 
have coefficients that were almost always insignificantly different from zero at the 
95% confidence level.  
5. Measuring the Size of the Age and Cohort Effects on Well-being 
Even if statistically significant, is such a U-shape in age large enough to be important 
empirically?  The data suggest that the answer is yes.   
One way to explore this is to compare the levels of well-being between, say, 
age 20 and age 45.  This difference -- in the equations that control for other factors -- 
is approximately 0.1 to 0.2 cardinal well-being points, and this is around one fifth of a 
standard deviation in well-being scores.  At first sight that does not appear 
particularly large.  But, because the standard deviation is dominated by cross-section 
variation in reported well-being, there is a more useful and evocative way to think 
about the size of the age and age-squared effect.  Going from age 20 to age 45 is 
approximately equal to one third of the size of the effect of the unemployment  14
coefficient in a well-being equation.  That is suggestive of a large effect on well-
being.   
  Although the birth-cohort coefficients (on Born<1900, Born 1900-1910, etc) 
are not always individually well-defined, there are signs from the Tables that the 
United States and Europe differ quite strongly in the time structure of the cohort 
effects upon happiness.  In Tables 1 and 2, there is evidence that successive American 
generations became progressively less happy from 1900 to today.  This conclusion is 
reminiscent of one of Easterlin’s (2006), although he uses a different statistical 
method.   
In Europe, by contrast, Tables 3 and 4 suggest that cohort well-being falls 
initially from the beginning of the century but, after bottoming out in the 1950s 
(which is the omitted base category) has actually been rising throughout the most 
recent generations.  This is particularly clear for males.  The coefficient of 0.3206 (t = 
2.36) for the final cohort, in the fifth column of Table 3, implies that, by this criterion 
the most recent generation of European men is ceteris paribus the happiest of the 20th 
century.   
As with the effect of moving along the quadratic function in age, cohort 
dummy variables are here large in magnitude; they are not merely different from zero 
on a formal significance test.  Put loosely, cohort effects are two or three times as 
large as the effect from the U-shape in age.  The single greatest effect is visible in the 
equations for US males in Table 1.  Here, comparing the happiest cohort of 
Americans to the least happy, the cardinalized well-being difference through the 
generations exceeds half of one standard-deviation of the happiness measure.  In all 
the tables, whilst the details differ, estimated cohort effects are quantitatively 
significant and not merely statistically significant.    15
It might be argued that the use of language itself could have altered over the 
century (perhaps modern generations of highly educated TV-watchers have become 
linguistically more or less expressive), and hence that in the US and Europe the 
paper’s estimated happiness-cohort effects are partly or wholly an illusion caused by 
this changing nature of words.  It is not easy to guard against such possibilities in a 
definitive way.  Nevertheless, one piece of evidence against such a view comes out of 
the clear difference between the two continents’ results.  The estimated pattern of the 
cohort effects is very different between the US and Europe.  As, no doubt because of 
common trends in technology, both continents’ ways of living have changed in 
broadly similar ways since 1900, it is not easy to see how the coefficients on the 
cohort dummies could be explained solely by some form of changed use of language 
in the modern world.  These cohort effects seem unlikely to be simply a mirage 
caused by alterations in the way that different generations use, and perceive the 
meaning of, words.        
6. Conclusions 
This paper studies happiness and life-satisfaction data on 500,000 Americans and 
Europeans.  It draws two main conclusions.  First, psychological well-being depends 
in a curvilinear way upon age.  Second, there are important differences in the reported 
happiness levels of different birth-cohorts. 
The paper’s results draw upon regression equations and use data sets long 
enough to distinguish age effects from cohort effects.  They suggest that reported 
well-being is U-shaped in age and that the convex structure of the curve is similar 
across different parts of the Western world.  It should be emphasized that, because the 
paper’s equations control for many other influences upon happiness and life 
satisfaction, including income, education and marriage, these results should be read as  16
describing ceteris-paribus well-being.  As Easterlin (2006) has shown, and as we 
confirm, in raw American data there is no U-shape (though in European data we 
demonstrate that the U-shape is visible without the inclusion of any controls).   
Happiness among American males and females reaches its estimated 
minimum at approximately ages 49 and 45 respectively.  Life satisfaction levels 
among European men minimize at age 44 and among European women at age 43.  
Our correction for birth-cohort influences makes some difference to the results 
claimed by the earlier literature, especially in American well-being equations, but the 
general spirit of a U-shape is unaffected by cohort effects.  How these US results fit 
together with those of Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) on the rising well-being of 
the young is not completely clear, but it seems likely that there are divergent trends 
within-cohort.    
It could reasonably be objected that our method has had to rely on decadal 
proxies for cohorts of Americans and Europeans.  How to do better than this, 
nevertheless, is not clear if the aim is to maintain also age and year effects within the 
equations.  Moreover, if subtler cohort effects were of major importance, we might 
expect to see more evidence of equation instability when they are (imperfectly) 
introduced in the form of the decade-long dummy variables. 
By definition, this paper has one important limitation.  It is that these 
international data sets do not follow the same individuals over the years.  As far as we 
know, there is no internationally comparable panel data set on multiple nations in 
which general happiness or well-being questions are asked (a European Household 
Panel is currently being constructed but asks only questions such as income-
satisfaction and housing-satisfaction).  It is perhaps also worth pointing out that panel  17
data have their own disadvantages, particularly that of sometimes high levels of 
measurement error.     
What truly causes the U-shaped curve in human well-being, and the noticeable 
regularity of its mathematical shape in different parts of the industrialized world, is 
currently unknown.  Potential answers, some more plausible than others, include the 
following.   
•  One possibility is that individuals learn to adapt to their strengths and 
weaknesses, and in mid-life quell the infeasible aspirations of their 
youth.   
•  Another -- though it is hard to see how it could be quantitatively large 
at midlife -- is that cheerful people live systematically longer than the 
miserable, and that the U-shape somehow traces out in part a selection 
effect.   
•  A third is that a kind of comparison process is at work: I have seen 
school-friends die and come eventually to value my blessings during 
my remaining years. 
There are likely to be others. 
Understanding the roots of the U-shaped life cycle pattern of well-being, and 
uncovering what might have produced the pronounced birth-cohort effects 
documented in this paper, seems an important task for future work. 
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Table 1.  Happiness Equations for Men in the USA: Pooled Data 1974-2004  
                                                         
Age  .0096*  .0066* -.0254* -.0171* -.0552* 
    (11.36) (4.83) (4.24) (2.34) (4.03) 
Age
2      .00035*  .00026*  .00056* 
        (5.48) (3.49) (4.00) 
Born <1900   .6851*   2.3501* 
 (2.05)    (1.96) 
Born 1900-1909    .8175*     .6585 
  (3.09)     (1.45) 
Born 1910-1919   .5418*     .7133* 
  (2.58)     (2.41) 
Born 1920-1929   .4122*     .3769 
  (2.57)     (1.75) 
Born 1930-1939   .2416*     .2324 
  (2.14)     (1.57) 
Born 1940-1949    .0441    .0685 
  (0.66)     (0.81) 
Born 1960-1969   .0087     -.0222 
  (0.12)     (0.26) 
Born 1970-1979   -.0709    -.2038 
 (0.58)    (1.34) 
Born 1980 +   -.1983   -.3137 
 (0.89)  (1.08) 
Log  of  household  income       .1727* 
       ( 6 . 8 3 )  
 
Personal  controls  No Yes Yes Yes  Yes   
 
Cut1  -1.5040  -.9830 -1.5561 -1.5089 -1.2807 
Cut2  1.3120 2.0188 1.4489 1.4995 1.9392 
 
Sample size  19,027  18,914    18,914  18,914  11,404 
Pseudo R
2  .0066  .0476    .0476 .0484 .0490 
Log likelihood ratio  -17725  -16891    -16891  -16878  -9823 
 
Age at the happiness  minimum    36.8  34.4  49.5 
 
 
The dependent variable, here and in later tables, is a measure of subjective well-being.  The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics; they test the null hypothesis of a coefficient of zero.  Stars * denote a coefficient 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  All five regression equations are to be read vertically.  They 
are ordered logits and include 24 year-dummies and 9 region-dummies.  ‘Personal controls’ are the number of 
years of education, two race-dummies, 8 number-of-children dummies, 7 workforce-status dummies, a dummy 
for parents divorced when respondent was 16, and 4 marital-status dummies.  ‘Yes’ means these variables are 
included in the equation.  The ‘base’ excluded cohort is that for people born 1950-1959.  The data set excludes 
1979, 1981, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003.  The exact wording of the well-being question is: “Taken 
all together, how would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or 
not too happy?” 
Source: General Social Survey, 1974-2004   22
Table 2.   Happiness Equations for Women in the USA: Pooled Data 1974-2004                                         
 
Age  .0006  .0076* -.0188* -.0584* -.0687* 
      (0.90) (7.23) (3.83) (4.54)  (4.89) 
Age
2      .00028*  .00065*  .00076* 
       (5.50)  (4.97)  (5.25) 
Born <1900     .1693  1.9574 
    (0.67)  (1.41) 
Born 1900-1909     .2183  .8228 
    (0.96)     (1.65) 
Born 1910-1919   .2060     .4297 
  (1.13)     (1.40) 
Born 1920-1929   .0803  .3420 
   (0.57)     (1.55) 
Born 1930-1939   .1092   .2802 
    (1.10)     (1.87) 
Born 1940-1949   .0748     .1592 
  (1.27)     (1.88) 
Born 1960-1969   .1958*  .1068 
    (3.18)     (1.26) 
Born 1970-1979   .2235*     -.0183 
 (2.09)    (0.12) 
Born 1980 +   .2032      -.2582 
 (0.98)      (0.86) 
Log  of  household  income       .1138* 
       ( 5 . 1 0 )  
 
Personal  controls  No Yes Yes Yes  Yes   
 
 
Cut1  -1.9197 -1.7992 -1.1957  -.9068 -1.5689 
Cut2  .7897 1.3041 1.7067 1.9982 1.5769 
 
Sample size  24,148  24,017    24,017  24,017  11,158 
Pseudo R
2  .0032  .0472    .0474 .0481 .0469 
Log likelihood ratio  -22884  -10844    -21751  -21737  -9727 
 
Age at the happiness minimum      33.6   44.9  45.1 
 
 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  All equations are ordered logits and include 24 year-dummies and 9 
region-dummies.  ‘Personal controls’ are the number of years of education, two race-dummies, 8 number-of-
children dummies, 7 workforce-status dummies, a dummy for parents divorced when respondent was 16, and 4 
marital-status dummies.  The ‘base’ excluded cohort is that for people born 1950-1959.  The data set excludes 
1979, 1981, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003.  The exact wording of the well-being question is: “Taken 
all together, how would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or 
not too happy?” 
Source: General Social Survey, 1974-2004   23
Table 3.   Life Satisfaction Equations for Men in Europe: Pooled Data 1975-1998 
                                        
Age  .0007*   .0020* -.0487* -.0456* -.0402* 
  (3.06)  (4.44) (26.15) (15.12) (11.50) 
Age
2       .00056*  .00048*  .00046* 
        (28.02) (17.05) (13.86) 
Born <1900  .2129  .2163 
 (1.76)  (1.57) 
Born 1900-1909  .3012*   .2924* 
 (3.51)  (2.99) 
Born 1910-1919  .2842*  .2710* 
 (4.20)  (3.50) 
Born 1920-1929  .2488*  .2012* 
   (4.89)  (3.45) 
Born 1930-1939   .1695*  .1058* 
 (4.70)  (2.56) 
Born 1940-1949  .1073*  .0618* 
 (4.82)  (2.44) 
Born 1960-1969  .0994*  .1244* 
   (4.48)  (4.86) 
Born 1970-1979  .2391*   .2806* 
 (6.43)  (6.34) 
Born 1980 +     .3671*   .3206* 
 (3.99)  (2.36) 
Log  of  household  income       .4090* 
         (44.03) 
 
Personal  controls  No Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
 
Cut1  -2.5090 -2.5090 -3.1872 -3.250  .2291 
Cut2  -.9548  -.9548 -1.5046 -1.6566  1.8564 
Cut3  1.8061 1.8060 1.2503 1.1907 4.7525 
 
Sample  size  200,848  188,321   188,321  188,321 142,738 
Pseudo R
2  .0403 .0572    .0591 .0596  .0680 
Log likelihood ratio  -211799  -195182    -194788  -194685  -146279 
 
Age at the life-satisfaction minimum    43.4  47.1      44.1 
 
 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  All equations are ordered logits and include 10 country-dummies 
and 19 year-dummies.  ‘Personal controls’ are 9 educational-qualification dummies, 6 workforce-status 
dummies, and 5 marital-status dummies.  The ‘base’ excluded cohort is that for people born 1950-1959.  The 
data set excludes 1981, and columns 2-4 also exclude 1995 and 1996 because there are no income variables for 
those years.  The exact wording of the well-being question is: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”  The countries are France, Belgium, 
Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, Great Britain, Greece, Spain and Portugal.   
Source: Eurotrends file ( Eurobarometer, ICPSR #3384)   24
Table 4.   Life Satisfaction Equations for Women in Europe: Pooled Data 1975-1998 
                                             
Age  -.0052*  .0020* -.0400* -.0375* -.0378* 
  (22.06)  (5.44) (23.72) (13.39) (11.53) 
Age
2    .00045*  .00041*  .00044* 
      (25.50) (16.02) (14.98) 
Born <1900   .1313    .0171 
 (1.16)  (0.13)) 
Born 1900-1909   .1253    .0846 
 (1.53)  (0.89) 
Born 1910-1919   .1443*    .1006 
 (2.22)  (1.33) 
Born 1920-1929   .1079*    .0530 
 (2.20)  (0.93) 
Born 1930-1939   .0534    -.0101 
 (1.54)  (0.25) 
Born 1940-1949   .0587*    -.0028 
 (2.74)  (0.11) 
Born 1960-1969   .0321    .0729* 
 (1.50)  (2.93) 
Born 1970-1979   .1696*   .2030* 
   (4.66)  (4.64) 
Born 1980 +   .1542    .0851 
 (1.61)  (0.59) 
Log of household income    .3931* 
   (44.24) 
 
Personal controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
 
Cut1  -2.7348 -2.2078 -2.9784 -2.8848  .1411 
Cut2  -1.1069  -.5541 -1.3217 -1.2277  1.8301 
Cut3  1.6583 2.2672 1.5066 1.6015 4.6949 
 
Sample size  214,857  201,431    201,431  201,431      148,249 
Pseudo R
2  .0553 .0678 .0692 .0694 .0770 
Log likelihood ratio  -224,535  -207,685    -207,360  -207,320     -152,110 
 
Age at the life-satisfaction minimum    44.5  46.3        42.6 
 
 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  All equations are ordered logits and include 10 country-dummies 
and 19 year-dummies. ‘Personal controls’ are 9 educational-qualification dummies, 6 workforce-status 
dummies, and 5 marital-status dummies.  The ‘base’ excluded cohort is that for people born 1950-1959.  The 
data set excludes 1981, and columns 2-4 also exclude 1995 and 1996 because there are no income variables for 
those years.  The exact wording of the well-being question is: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”  The countries are France, Belgium, 
Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, Great Britain, Greece, Spain and Portugal.   
Source: Eurotrends file (Eurobarometer, ICPSR #3384) 
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Appendix Table A1.  Happiness Equations for Men in the USA: Pooled Data 1974-2004  
                                                           
Age  .0068* .0215*  -.0061 -.0117 -.0121 -.0172*  -.0550* 
    (2.31) (3.32) (0.89) (1.70) (1.73) (2.35) (4.02) 
Age
2   -.00016* .00015* .00019* .00020* .00025* .00055* 
    (2.55) (2.34) (2.92) (2.99) (3.48) (3.99) 
Years  of  schooling     .0499*  .0490*  .0425*  .0279* 
      (10.59)  (10.26)  (8.81)  (3.97) 
Log  of  household  income         .1739 
         ( 6 . 9 2 )  
Race  dummies 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Year  dummies 23 23 23 23 23 23 19 
Region  dummies  8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Cohort  dummies  9 9 9 9 9 9 9   
Marital  status  dummies  0 0 4 4 4 4 4 
#  children  dummies  0 0 0 0 8 8 8 
Labour  market  dummies  0 0 0 0 0 7 7 
 
Cut1  -1.4882 -1.3307 -2.0118 -1.7384 -1.8199 -2.0250 -4.2454 
Cut2  1.3480 1.5066  .9445 1.2307 1.1523  .9735  -1.0285 
 
Sample  size  19027  19027    19026  18984 18920 18920 11404     
Pseudo R
2  .0111 .0118    .0377 .0408 .0414 .0464 .0484 
Log likelihood ratio  -17646  -17643    -17169  -17078  -17006  -16918  -9830 
 
Age at the happiness minimum      30.8  30.2  34.4  50.0   
 
All equations are ordered logits.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; they test the null hypothesis of a coefficient of zero.  Stars * denote a coefficient significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level.  The data set excludes 1979, 1981, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003.  The exact wording of the well-being question is: “Taken all 
together, how would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?”.  Income is only available from 1977. 
Source: General Social Survey, 1974-2004   26
Appendix Table A2.  Happiness Equations for Men in the USA: Pooled Data 1974-2004  
                                               Never married                          Ever married                             Whites                           Non-whites              
Age  -.0493* -.0741*  .0009  -.0374* -.0244* -.0607*  .0087  -.0639 
    (3.01) (2.42) (0.11) (2.25) (3.07) (4.08) (0.45) (1.70) 
Age
2  .00055* .00088*  -.00001  .00033* .0003*  .00055* .00006  .00096* 
  (2.77) (2.26) (0.08) (2.01) (4.04) (3.72) (0.30) (2.30) 
Years  of  schooling  .0906* .0658* .0504* .0194* .0533* .0381*  -.0030 -.0106 
  (7.39) (3.96) (9.92) (2.48)  (10.06) (4.92) (0.25) (0.61) 
Log of household income    .1604*    .1915*    .1890*    .1203* 
   (3.45)   (6.32)    (6.79)    (2.01) 
Race  dummies 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 
Year  dummies 23 19 23 19 23 19 23 19 
Region  dummies  8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Cohort  dummies  9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9   
Marital  status  dummies  0 0 3 3 4 4 4 4 
#  children  dummies  0 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Labour  market  dummies  7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
 
Cut1  -1.6731  -.7926 -1.5905 -4.4932 -2.0819 -4.6474 -1.5266 -2.5237 
Cut2  1.5517 2.6213 1.2721  -1.3269  .9740  -1.3510 1.3013  .4574 
 
Sample  size  4282 2838    14702  8582  16050 9651 2870 1753 
Pseudo R
2  .0241 .0358    .0126 .0461 .0443 .0475 .0543 .0584 
Log  likelihood  ratio  -3715 -2368    -13655  -7429  -14190 -8198 -2659 -1580 
 
Age at happiness minimum  44.8 42.1    56.7  40.7  55.2    33.3 
    
All equations are ordered logits.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  Stars * denote a coefficient significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  The data set 
excludes 1979, 1981, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003.  The exact wording of the well-being question is: “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days 
– would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?”.  Income is only available from 1977. 
Source: General Social Survey, 1974-2004   27
Appendix Table A3.   Life Satisfaction Equations for Men in Europe: Pooled Data 1975-1998 
                                                                   Single          Ever married 
Age  .0007* -.0038* -.0331* -.0514* -.0423* -.0303* -.0893* -.0278* 
  (3.06)  (2.49) (13.06) (18.91) (14.63) (9.15)  (12.91) (6.30) 
Age
2     .00034* .00052* .00047* .00035* .00091* .00037* 
      (14.51) (20.96) (17.83) (11.18) (10.79)  (9.35) 
Log  of  household  income        .4769*  .3037*  .4977* 
         (54.70)  (19.22)  (42.61) 
  
Cohort  dummies  0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9   
Schooling  dummies    0    0    0 0 9 9 9 9 
Year  dummies 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Country  dummies  9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Marital  status  dummies  0 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 
Labour  market  dummies  0 0 0 0 0 6 6 6 
 
 
Cut1  -2.5089 -3.1638 -3.3031 -3.5316 -3.0067  .5922 -2.6624  1.2381 
Cut2  -.9548    -1.6060 -1.7449 -1.9720 -1.4403  2.2181 -1.0015  2.8511 
Cut3   1.8060    1.1659   1.0294  .8177  1.3639  5.1017  1.9168  5.7367 
 
Sample size  200,848  200,848    200,848  194,566     189,203     147285   37,414      105,324 
Pseudo R
2  .0403
  .0427    .0432 .0465 .0500 .0653 .0638 .0683 
Log likelihood ratio  -211799  -211282    -211177  -204793    -197520     -151415  -38492      -107852 
 
Age  at  life-satisfaction  minimum   48.7  49.4  45.0 43.3  49.1 37.6     
 
All equations are ordered logits.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  All equations are ordered logits.  The data set excludes 1981, and columns 2-4 also exclude 
1995 and 1996 because there are no income variables for those years. Ever married includes living as married. The exact wording of the well-being question is: “On the 
whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”  The countries are France, Belgium, Netherlands, West 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, Great Britain, Greece, Spain and Portugal.   
Source: Eurotrends file ( Eurobarometer, ICPSR #3384) 
 